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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-TAX CONSEQUENCES OF 
A GIFT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH BY A JOINT TENANT OR A 
TENANT BY THE ENTIRETY-One of the more difficult problems 
facing the estate planner today is to determine the relationship 
between sections 2035 and 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, as applied to a situation where a joint tenancy or tenancy 
by the entirety is severed in contemplation of death. The problem 
might arise in the following setting: Husband (H) and wife (W) 
hold 40,000 dollars worth of property in joint tenancy, H having 
contributed the entire purchase price. In contemplation of H's 
death, Hand W give the property to their son (S), with the intent 
of reducing H's gross estate. (Alternatively, H might transfer his 
share to Win consideration for W transferring her share to H, 
thereby creating a tenancy in common.) H dies within three years 
after completion of the transaction. Section 2035, the general 
"contemplation of death" provision, provides: 
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property ... to the extent of any interest therein of which the 
decedent has at any time made a trans/ er ( except in case of a 
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in con-
templation of his death."1 
Section 2040, dealing with joint tenancies held at the time of 
death, provides: 
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property . . . to the extent of the interest therein held as 
joint tenants by the decedent and any other person, or as 
tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse ... except 
such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged 
to such other person and never to have been received or ac-
quired by the latter from the decedent for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth .... "2 
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. (Emphasis added.) 
2 INT, REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040. (Emphasis added.) 
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The key interpretative problem under each section involves 
a determination of what "interest" H had in the property. Sec-
tion 2040, the joint tenancy provision, uses a special tax concept 
in defining the decedent's interest. Thus, if at the time of H's 
death H and W own property as joint tenants ( or tenants by the 
entirety) and H has made the entire contribution necessary to 
purchase the property, then its entire value (40,000 dollars) is 
included in H's gross estate.3 Although under local property law 
H owns only one-half of the jointly held property,4 section 2040 
ignores this property law concept.5 Section 2035, the general 
"contemplation of death" provision, has, on the other hand, 
been interpreted to require that H's interest be determined ac-
cording to local property law.6 Thus, when H makes a gift in con-
templation of death, his interest in the joint property is valued, 
for tax purposes, at 20,000 dollars. 
The result of this divergent treatment under sections 2035 
and 2040 is that H can partially deplete his gross estate by sever-
ing his joint tenancy even though the transaction is in contempla-
tion of death.7 The anomaly of such a result becomes apparent 
upon an examination of the two following examples. If H has 
sole title to property valued at 40,000 dollars and makes a gift 
of this property in contemplation of his death, the entire 40,000 
dollars is included in his gross estate.8 Likewise, where Hand W 
continue to hold joint property valued at 40,000 dollars, and the 
entire contribution was made by H, at H's death 40,000 dollars is 
included in his gross estate.9 But a combination of the two ex-
amples-a gift in contemplation of death of the jointly held prop-
erty-results in only 20,000 dollars being included in H's gross 
estate.10 
3 E.g., United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 
497 (1930); Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (1962). 
4 E.g., Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Estate of Don 
Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), afj'd on other grounds, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir, 1954). 
5 See cases cited in note 3 supra. As used in this comment, the phrase "local property 
law" means the generally applicable state common-law and statutory rules defining and 
governing rights and interests in things, as opposed to rules which are specially formu-
lated for taxation or other purposes and which normally apply only in that context. 
6 See, e.g., Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Baltimore 
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 642 (D. Md. 1955); A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. 
584 (1955); Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955). Contra, United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 
916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); Harris v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 
736 (D. Neb. 1961). 
7 See, e.g., Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, supra note 6. 
s Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1 (1962). 
9 See cases cited in note 3 supra. 
10 See cases cited in note 6 supra. 
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This comment will examine the foregoing problem in light 
of several recent cases which have cast doubt on the presently 
conceived relationship between section 2035 and section 2040. 
I. PURPOSES OF SECTIONS 2035 AND 2040 
In the Revenue Act of 1916 the predecessors of sections 2033,11 
2035,12 and 204013 were all part of the same section. Section 2033 
of the 1954 Code is a "shotgun" provision which requires in-
clusion of a decedent's entire probate estate in his gross estate 
for estate tax purposes.14 Sections 2035 and 2040 are policing 
provisions intended to prevent avoidance of section 2033.15 Thus, 
if H makes a testamentary type gift, intending to deplete his pro-
bate estate, section 2035 is designed to bring the entire amount 
of this gift into his gross estate.16 "Underlying the present statute 
is the policy of taxing such gifts equally with testamentary dis-
positions, for which they may be substituted, and the prevention 
of the evasion of estate taxes by gifts made before, but in con-
templation of, death."17 Once a testamentary purpose is found, 
the gift is treated, for valuation purposes, as though it had never 
been made.18 
Section 2040 is also designed to complement section 2033 by 
preventing estate tax avoidance through use of concurrent owner-
ship devices.19 Under local property law, H could put all of his 
property into a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety, with 
a resultant partial depletion of his probate estate.2° For instance, 
in the hypothetical example where H owned property valued at 
40,000 dollars and placed it all in joint tenancy with W, he has 
depleted his net worth by 20,000 dollars from a property law 
standpoint. In reality, however, H has retained many of the normal 
benefits of ownership. He still has, at least, an undivided interest 
11 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(a), 39 Stat. 777. 
12 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777. 
13 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(c), 39 Stat. 778. 
14 INT. R.Ev. CooE OF 1954, § 2033: "The value of the gross estate shall include the 
value of all property . • • to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the 
time of his death." 
ll'i See United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116 (1931) (§ 2035); Milliken v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 15, 23 (1931) (§ 2035); Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 505 (1930) 
(§ 2040); Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935) (§ 2035). 
16 Section 2035, however, treats only a gift made within three years prior to death 
as made iI). contemplation of death. 
17 Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 23 (1931). 
18 Sec, e.g., Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935). 
IO See Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930). 
20 See cases cited in note 4 supra. 
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in the income and possession of the property, and, even more im-
portant, he has retained a right to receive the entire property if he 
survives W.21 Thus, but for section 2040, the transfer by H to H 
and W would be a device by which H could retain many of the 
benefits of ownership and at the same time partly deplete his gross 
estate. Section 2040 purports to close this loophole by including 
within H's gross estate that proportionate amount of the property 
which was contributed solely by H and which has depleted his 
probate estate. Thus, when H makes the entire contribution and 
dies before W, the entire value of the tenancy is included in H's 
gross estate.22 However, if W dies before H, nothing is included in 
W's gross estate.28 
It is apparent that section 2040 is grounded upon a tax concept 
of ownership, for it ignores the "shadowy and intricate distinc-
tions of common law property concepts and ancient fictions."24 
However, section 2040 does not contain a built-in "contempla-
tion of death" provision. Thus, when the tenancy is severed in 
contemplation of death, any attempt to preserve the integrity of 
section 2040 depends on whether section 2035 will be interpreted 
as incorporating the special tax concept of section 2040. 
Il. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SECTIONS 2035 AND 204025 
Although sections 2035 and 2040 are both intended to have the 
same sort of policing function, they use somewhat different lan-
guage to implement this general purpose. Section 2035 is built 
around the phrase "interest therein of which the decedent has at 
any time made a transfer." Section 2040 is keyed to the phrase 
"to the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants." In 
United States v. Field26 the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase 
"to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time 
of his death," as used in the predecessor to section 2033 (the "shot-
gun" provision), to mean "local property interest" when applied 
to a testamentary exercise of a general power of appointment.27 
21 See 4 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 615-18 (1954 ed.); Swenson &: Degnan, Severance 
of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. R.Ev. 466 (1954). 
22 See cases cited in note 3 supra. 
28 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (1962). 
24 United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369 (1939). 
25 See Wright, Transfers of Joint Property in Contemplation of Death, 55 M1cH. L. 
REv. 1, 3, 4 (1956). 
26 255 U.S. 257 (1921). See Wright, supra note 25, for a more detailed analysis of 
the history of §§ 2035 and 2040 and the role of Field. 
27 Congress subsequently incorporated a "contemplation of death" provision into 
§§ 2038 (revocable transfers) and 2041 (powers of appointment). However, §§ 2036 (re-
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However, when a section 2035 /2040 case finally reached the Tax 
Court, the local property law approach of the Field case was not 
extended to section 2035.28 As to both a joint tenancy and a tenancy 
by the entirety, the Tax Court found that H's section 2035 inter-
est was to be determined by reference to his section 2040 interest. 
Thus, H's section 2035 interest was equal to the amount by which 
his gross estate would have otherwise been depleted. Where H, 
in contemplation of his death, transferred his share to Wand in 
turn W transferred her share to H, creating a tenancy in common, 
the court found that H had not received an adequate considera-
tion since his estate would have otherwise been depleted by one-
half the value of the jointly held property. However, in Sullivan's 
Estate v. Commissioner29 the Ninth Circuit applied the local prop-
erty law concept of Field to section 2035. H had created a joint 
tenancy with W. In contemplation of H's death Hand W made 
two transfers, giving part of the joint property to S as a gift, while 
the rest of the joint property was transferred from H and W to 
H and W, thereby creating a tenancy in common. As to the first 
transfer, the court found that under local property law W owned 
one-half of the property prior to the transfer, and since W was 
still alive this one-half could not have been transferred in con-
templation of death. As to the second transfer, the court again 
found that W owned one-half of the property and therefore her 
transfer to H was full consideration for H's transfer to her. The 
result was that H successfully depleted his gross estate by one-half 
the value of the joint tenancy. 
The Sullivan case view of section 2035 was extended by the 
Tax Court, in A. Carl Borner,80 to a tenancy by the entirety. The 
court reasoned that there was no real difference between a joint 
tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety, and thus Sullivan was ap-
plicable. This decision arguably rests upon an improper inter-
pretation of Sullivan,81 since there is a significant difference be-
taincd life estates) and 2040 were not amended and still depend upon § 2035 to maintain 
their total effectiveness. 
28 William MacPhcrson Hornor, 44 B.T.A. ll36 (1941), afj'd on other grounds, 130 
F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942). Sec also Frank K. Sullivan, IO T.C. 961 (1948), rev'd, 175 F.2d 
657 (9th Cir. 1949). The Third Circuit also accepted the Tax Court view in Common-
wealth Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 137 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1943). 
29 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949). 
80 25 T.C. 584 (1955). 
81 For a criticism of Bomer, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956). Sullivan requires an 
analysis at the local property law level. In terms of local property law, each tenant is 
seised "of the whole interest and not of a share." Thus, any transfer by H and W is 
made totally by each. So H has transferred a 100% interest in contemplation of death. 
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tween a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety when viewed 
from the standpoint of local property law. Nevertheless, the 
Commissioner subsequently acquiesced in this approach.32 
It is apparent that, under the doctrine of Sullivan and related 
cases, the usefulness of section 2035 as a measure to preserve fully 
the effectiveness of section 2040 and, ultimately, the ultility of 
section 2033, in this respect, is severely limited.33 A complete solu-
tion to this problem may well require a change in the provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code. What appears to be at least a partial 
answer, however, was supplied by the Tenth Circuit in 1961. 
III. A p ARTIAL ANSWER: THE ALLEN CASE 
In United States v. Allen34 A created an irrevocable trust, re-
taining three-fifths of the income for life. At age seventy-eight, 
A's life estate had an actuarial value of 135,000 dollars. However, 
if A had died the life estate would bring 900,000 dollars into her 
gross estate under section 2036. Apparently realizing her pre-
carious estate tax situation, A sold her life estate to B for 140,000 
dollars, which was more than its fair market value. Valued by 
actuarial methods, A's interest was worth 135,000 dollars so that, 
although in contemplation of death, her transfer was for an ade-
quate consideration within the Sullivan view of section 2035. 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that 
any amount less than 900,000 dollars was not adequate considera-
tion for purposes of section 2035. Thus, 760,000 dollars was in-
cluded in A's gross estate as a gift in contemplation of death. 
Significantly, this holding implies that A's "interest" under sec-
tion 2035 was determined by reference to the "tax interest" con-
cept embodied in section 2036, rather than by reference to the 
local property law concept previously attributed to section 2035.35 
Extending this reasoning to the section 2040 setting, it becomes 
32 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 4, acquiescing in A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. 584 (1955); 1956-2 
CuM. BULL. 5, and 1956-1 CUM. BuLL. 3, acquiescing in Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955); 
1955-2 CuM. BULL. 4, acquiescing in Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952). 
33 For criticism of the post-Sullivan situation, see LOWNDES &: KRAMER, FEDERAL EsrATE 
AND GIFT TAXES 78 (2d ed. 1962): Lowndes, Cutting the "Strings" on Inter Vivos Trans-
fers in Contemplation of Death, 43 MINN. L. REv. 57, 64, 70 (1958); Wright, supra note 25. 
84 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). 
85 For another illustration of this approach, see Harris v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 
736 (D. Neb. 1961), where the court reached a "tax interest" result, citing Sullivan. Cf. 
Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1928); Heller v. District of Columbia, 198 F.2d 
983 (D.D.C. 1952): Estate of Thurston, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950) (dictum). 
But see Glaser v. United States, 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962). 
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clear that Allen and Sullivan take inconsistent positions.36 The 
Allen view would conclude that section 2035 assumes importance 
when applied to transfers of property which would otherwise be 
included by sections 2033, 2036, or 2040. If Allen is extended to 
the 2040 setting, the critical test for section 2035 would no longer 
be the extent of decedent's interest measured by local property 
law, but rather the extent of decedent's interest measured in 
terms of the amount by which his gross estate would be depleted 
for federal estate tax purposes. 
The future of the Allen "tax interest" theory is still uncertain. 
The Seventh Circuit refused to apply the Allen view in Glaser 
v. United States.37 In Glaser, H and W held property as tenants 
by the entirety, with the entire contribution coming from H. H 
and W transferred this property to S with a retained life estate. 
Upon H's death the Government claimed that the total value of 
the property, less the value of W's life estate, should be included in 
H's gross estate under section 2036. The court, however, held that 
only one-half of the value of the property transferred to S should 
be included in H's gross estate, relying on Sullivan. The court 
reasoned that the transfer from H and W to S terminated the 
tenancy by the entirety; therefore, section 2040 was not applicable. 
Since under local law H owned only one-half of the property, he 
could transfer only one-half with a retained life estate. Therefore, 
only one-half of the value of the property could be included in 
H's gross estate. It must be noted that, although section 2035 was 
not involved, the phrase "interest . . . of which the decedent has 
at any time made a transfer" is used in both section 2035 and sec-
tion 2036. Therefore, Glaser is clearly inconsistent with Allen. 
While Glaser casts some doubt on the future of the "tax in-
terest" view, the Commissioner has reacted to Allen by withdraw-
ing his previous acquiescence and substituting his non-acqui-
escence in three Tax Court cases decided on the basis of Sullivan 
in the section 2035 /2040 setting.38 Also, the "tax interest" view 
of Allen is consistent with the view advocated by many writers in 
the field.30 In light of the Commissioner's action, one could con-
clude that any estate planner who hopes to take advantage of 
30 Sec Comment, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 103 (1960) (written before the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the lower court in Allen). 
37 306 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962). 
38 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 4, withdrawing acquiescence and substituting non-acquiesence in 
A. Carl Bomer, 25 T.C. 584 (1955); Edward Carnall, 25 T.C. 654 (1955); Estate of Don 
Murillo Brockway, 18 T.C. 488 (1952), aff d on other grounds, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1954). 
30 Sec materials cited in note 33 supra. · 
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Sullivan in the future will be taking the risk of becoming in-
volved in extended litigation. 
However, even working on the assumption that Allen will be 
extended to the section 2040 setting in the future, it is clear that 
there remains at least one barrier to complete harmonization of 
section 2035 and section 2040. Section 2035 refers only to a trans-
fer made by the decedent. However, when H and W hold joint 
property and W makes the transfer, this requisite to applicability 
is not met. Thus, the effectiveness of the Allen "tax interest" ap-
proach in neutralizing attempts to avoid the reach of section 
2040 depends to a substantial degree upon whether the non-con-
tributing tenant can unilaterally sever the tenancy, and, ulti-
mately, a satisfactory resolution of the problems raised by Allen 
can be gained only by an analysis of the incidents of ownership 
attributable to a tenancy by the entirety and a joint tenancy. 
IV. APPLICATION OF ALLEN TO TENANCIBS BY THE ENTIRETY 
A. Common-Law Incidents of Ownership 
At common law a tenancy by the entirety could be created by 
transferring real property to a husband and wife.40 Essentially, 
the tenancy by the entirety was a joint tenancy modified by the 
common-law fiction that husband and wife are legally but one 
person.n To create this tenancy, the four "unities" of interest, 
title, time, and possession were necessary, along with a fifth "unity" 
of marriage.42 In common-law theory each tenant was seised "of 
the whole interest and not of a share,"48 as opposed to joint tenants 
who were seised "of a share and of the whole."44 The result of 
this was that the survivorship right of one tenant in a tenancy 
by the entirety could not be defeated by any unilateral act on the 
part of the other. 45 
Although the tenancy was held by husband and wife, the com-
mon law gave virtually all of the incidents of ownership to the 
husband.46 During the marriage he had the power to manage, 
40 See MEGARRY &: WADE, REAL PROPERTY 408-09 (1957); 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 
21, § 620, at 653; Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 24 (1951). 
41 See MOYNIHAN, REAL PROPERTY 136 (1940); Phipps, supra note 40. See also United 
States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939). 
42 See 4 PoWELL, op. cit. supra note 21, § 620, at 653. 
48 MOYNIHAN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 136. See also MEGARRY &: WADE, op. cit. supr11 
note 40, at 408-09. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF P11.OPERTY § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952). 
46 Ibid. 
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control and dispose of income, and the right to total possession of 
the property.47 In case of litigation the husband alone represented 
the tenants.48 In addition, the husband's possessory and survivor-
ship rights were subject to the claims of his creditors.49 The wife, 
on the other hand, had no present possessory right, and her inter-
est was not vulnerable to creditors.50 
U pan the death of either tenant the total property passed to 
the survivor, just as in a joint tenancy. Since the survivorship 
right could not be defeated by either tenant's unilateral action,51 
it followed that neither tenant could convey a fee simple interest 
in the property unless his co-tenant joined in the conveyance.52 
Although the husband's interest was subject to his creditors, this 
did not affect the wife's survivorship right;53 for, if the husband 
predeceased his wife, the wife owned the property in fee, not-
withstanding the fact that her husband's creditor has attached his 
share.54 But if the wife predeceased her husband, his creditor 
would get the entire fee.55 One might conclude that the outstand-
ing characteristic of the tenancy by the entirety at common law 
was the indestructible nature of the right of survivorship.56 
B. The Modern Tenancy by the Entirety 
The tenancy by the entirety still exists in some form in twenty-
one states.57 Generally, this estate concept has been expanded to 
include personal prpperty, 58 and it is generally severed upon 
divorce.59 Aside from these basic changes, state law has evolved 






52 See 4 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 21, § 623, at 665. 
58 See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
156 See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939). 
157 For the most complete discussion of the attitude of the various states, see 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 21, 
§ 616; Phipps, supra note 40. The various writers have found between nineteen and 
twenty-one states (not counting Alaska and Hawaii) recognizing a tenancy by the en-
tirety. Since the common-law concepts have been substantially changed, it is difficult 
to classify a few of the states at all. The Phipps article, which lists nineteen states, 
would seem to provide the most complete survey. To this list must be added Alaska and 
Hawaii. See ALAsKA CoMP. LAws ANN. § 22-1-6 (1949); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 345-2 (Supp. 
1961). 
158 See Phipps, supra note 40, at 43-44. 
159 See 4 Po"wELL, op. cit. supra note 21, § 623, at 666. 
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Group A, including a majority of the twenty-one states, has 
altered the husband's dominant common-law position so that both 
the husband and wife have an equal right to occupancy, use and 
profit of the property.60 At the same time, the wife's common-law 
immunity from creditors has been extended to the husband.01 
These states have retained the common-law rule that the tenancy 
cannot be severed by the unilateral action of either spouse.62 
Group B consists of four states63 which have substantially al-
tered the common-law incidents of ownership with the result that 
either tenant can convey his or her present right to income and 
contingent right to survivorship.64 This modern tenancy by the 
entirety is often referred to as a "tenancy in common with an 
indestructible right of survivorship,"65 for the tenants can dispose 
of their present rights as if they had a tenancy in common, but 
cannot unilaterally affect the other tenant's right of survivorship. 
Thus, H might mortgage his interest to X. In case of a foreclosure, 
X and W would share the profits from the tenancy but W would 
still retain her right of survivorship.66 So, if W survives H, it is 
clear that W receives the entire estate and X's interest ceases to 
exist. On the other hand, if H survives W, then X owns the entire 
estate, with H receiving nothing.67 The same result would follow 
if H sold his interest to X without W joining in the transaction. 
Group C, consisting of two states,68 allows either tenant to 
convey unilaterally his or her contingent right of survivorship, 
much like group B. However, the transferee takes no present pos-
sessory right in the property, in contrast to group B.60 Thus, W's 
creditor, X, can attach W's contingent right of survivorship, but 
X has no present interest in the property. And, if H survives W, 
60 See Phipps, supra note 40, at 34, 46-57. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Arkansas, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. See Phipps, supra note 40, at 34. 
64 See, e.g., Pope v. McBride, 207 Ark. 940, 184 S.W.2d 259 (1944); Zanzonico v. 
Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1946); J. &: A. Steinberg Co. v. Pastive, 
97 N.J. Eq. 52, 129 Atl. 201 (Ch. 1925); Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); 
Lopez v. McQuade, 151 Misc. 390, 273 N.Y. Supp. 34 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Bartkowaik v. Samp-
son, 73 Misc. 446, 133 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Oneida County Ct. 1911); Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 
Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927). 
65 See, e.g., Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 120 Atl. 194 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1923); Hiles 
v. Fisher, supra note 64. 
66 See, e.g., Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); Bartkowaik v. Sampson, 
73 Misc. 446, 133 N.Y. Supp. 401 (Oneida County Ct. 1911); Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 Ore. 
116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927). 
67 See, e.g., Pope v. McBride, 207 Ark. 940, 184 S.W.2d 259 (1944). 
68 Kentucky and Tennessee. See Phipps, supra note 40, at 35. 
60 See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Sloan v. Sloan, 
182 Tenn. 162, 184 S.W .2d 391 (1945). • 
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then X's interest in the property ceases to exist.70 On the other 
hand, if W survives H, then X receives the total estate. 71 
Group D, consisting of three states,72 retains the basic common-
law incidents of ownership. H has the right to complete posses-
sion and to the use and income of the property.73 W has no pres-
ent interest.74 Following the common-law rules, W's interest is 
immune from her creditors and she cannot unilaterally convey 
any interest in the tenancy.75 H, on the other hand, can transfer his 
interest unilaterally, and the transferee has an immediate right 
to possession and use of all the property, with a contingent right 
of survivorship.76 However, H's transfer, as at common law, does 
not affect W's indestructible contingent right of survivorship.77 
In one of these states, H's interest is subject to his creditors, as it 
was at common law.78 In the other two states the common law has 
been changed so that H's interest is immune from creditors.79 
The remaining states have either done away with the tenancy 
by the entirety or have altered it so radically that it is the equiva-
lent of a joint tenancy.80 
C. Application of Allen to the Modern Tenancy by the Entirety 
Group A requires H and W to join in any conveyance. Assum-
ing that H has made the entire contribution necessary to purchase 
the property, application of the Allen "tax interest" theory would 
result in a finding that any transfer by H and W to S was made 
totally by H if made in contemplation of H's death, since the total 
value of the tenancy is the amount by which H's gross estate is 
depleted. Alternatively, if H and W sever the tenancy, thus creat-
ing a tenancy in common, in contemplation of H's death, the 
Allen approach would again find a total transfer by H, for again 
the decedent's estate is depleted. In these states W cannot transfer 
10 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina. See Phipps, supra note 40. 
73 See, e.g., MacNeil v. MacNeil, 312 Mass. 183, 43 N.E.2d 667 (1942); Phelps v. Simons, 
159 Mass. 415, 34 N.E. 657 (1893); Arrand v. Graham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W. 281 
(1941); Dombrowski v. Gorecke, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293 (1939). 
74 Ibid. 
75 See, e.g., Phelps v. Simons, 159 Mass. 415, 34 N.E. 657 (1893). 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 See Phipps, supra note 40. 
70 See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Humber, 264 Mich. 71, 249 N.W. 454 (1933). 
so See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 74 (1961). The statute provides for the creation 
of a tenancy by the entirety which has all the incidents of a joint tenancy. 
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her share unilaterally,81 so the "transfer-by-the-decedent" require-
ment of section 2035 would necessarily be fulfilled. 
Group B allows either tenant to convey unilaterally his or her 
present right to income and contingent right of survivorship, al-
though prohibiting either tenant from defeating his co-tenant's 
right of survivorship. If H, in contemplation of his death, transfers 
his interest to S, the Allen view would find a section 2035 transfer 
equal in value to H's section 2040 interest in the property, since 
this is the amount by which H's estate would otherwise be de-
pleted-H's interest for section 2035 purposes is the same as it 
would have been for section 2040 purposes had he not made the 
transfer. If H has made the total contribution and joins W in a 
conveyance to S, then H's interest is again equal to the total value 
of the transfer, just as it would be if H had made a unilateral 
conveyance, for W's tax interest is zero. The more troublesome 
problem arises where W unilaterally conveys her present interest 
and future contingent right of survivorship to S. Since there is 
no transfer by a decedent, the transaction is not within section 
2035. However, H's ownership is similar to a joint tenancy with 
S. Hand S share equally in the profits from the property, and H 
still has his contingent right of survivorship. If H predeceases 
W, then S for the first time has total ownership of the property. 
This has the practical effect, from H's point of view, of a purchase 
by Hand S as joint tenants with H making the entire contribution, 
in which case the total value of the property would be included 
in H's gross estate under section 2040. Thus, the gift from W to 
S should be treated as if it were a joint tenancy as to H, so that the 
entire value of H's interest is included in his gross estate under 
section 2040, without reference to section 2035. 
Group C allows either spouse to convey his contingent right 
of survivorship but does not allow alienation of the present right 
to possession or profits. If H or H and W transfer the property 
to S, the Allen "tax interest" theory would result in H's section 
2035 interest being equal to his section 2040 interest. From H's 
point of view, even if W sells her contingent right of survivor-
ship to S, a tenancy by the entirety still exists between Hand W, 
at least in regard to H's interest.Hand W continue in possession 
of the property, and H has a right of survivorship. So, at H's death 
his interest in the tenancy should be included in his gross estate 
under section 2040. 
81 See Phipps, supra note 40, at 34, 46-57. 
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Group D allows H to transfer the total right to income and 
possession and his contingent right of survivorship. W, however, 
cannot make any transfer. She has, in substance, an inalienable 
contingent remainder.82 Any conveyance by H, or by Hand W, 
in contemplation of H's death would come within the foregoing 
analysis of section 2035. Difficulty arises where W has made the 
entire contribution and H severs the tenancy in contemplation 
of W's death by a sale or gift to S.83 Since there is no transfer by 
the decedent (W), section 2035 is not applicable. Unlike the 
situation in the group B states, W does not have the substance of 
a joint tenancy with S. W has no right to income or possession, 
but merely a contingent right of survivorship, and thus she has 
no joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety and her property falls 
outside section 2040. It would seem that if W predeceased H 
none of this amount would be included in her gross estate even 
under the Allen view of depl~ting the gross estate. Thus, this 
very limited situation exemplifies one area where Allen would not 
completely close the gap left by Sullivan. 
V. APPLICATION OF ALLEN TO JOINT TENANCIES 
A. Common-Law Incidents of Ownership 
At common law a joint tenancy was an interest in land held 
by two or more persons (usually not husband and wife), with a 
right of survivorship.8• Like a tenancy by the entirety, the four 
"unities" of interest, title, time and possession were necessary 
for its creation.85 The important characteristic of the joint tenancy 
was the right of survivorship, which could not be defeated by the 
testamentary devise of a single co-tenant.86 However, unlike a 
tenancy by the entirety, this right of survivorship could be de-
feated by the co-tenant's unilateral conveyance during his life-
time.87 When a co-tenant conveys his interest to a third party, the 
joint tenancy is terminated and a tenancy in common is created 
82 See note 75 supra. 
88 This is a very limited occurrence if the reported cases are a valid indicator. 
Normally H makes the contribution and, even if he does not, W usually has a greater 
life expectancy. 
8{ See generally CHESHIRES, MODERN REAL PROPERTY 308-10 (8th ed. 1958); MOYNIHAN, 
op. cit. supra note 41, at 129-32; 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 615-18 (1954 ed.); Swenson 
& Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L. R.Ev. 466 (1954). 
85 See MOYNIHAN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 129; 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 84, 
§ 615, at 639. 
86 See United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 370 (1939); Swenson & Degnan, supra 
note 84, at 469-70. 
87 See Swenson & Degnan, supra note 84, at 468. 
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between the third party and the non-transferring tenant.88 A 
corrollary of this right of unilateral conveyance was that creditors 
of either tenant could reach their interests in the tenancy.89 
Today the joint tenancy still exists in the majority of states 
with few substantial changes. Joint tenancies usually may include 
personal property as well as real property. Also, in those states 
which have abandoned the tenancy by the entirety it is not un-
common to find husband and wife holding property in joint 
tenancy.00 
B. Application of Allen to the Severance of a Joint Tenancy 
Assume that A and B hold 40,000 dollars worth of property in 
joint tenancy, A having made the entire contribution. If A and 
B join in conveying the property to X, in contemplation of A's 
death, the Allen "tax interest" theory would operate to include 
the total value of the property in A's gross estate under section 
2035, for this is the amount by which A's probate estate would be 
depleted by the gift. This is in effect the pre-Sullivan Tax Court 
approach to joint tenancies.91 
I£ A conveys to X in contemplation of his own death, there is 
little difficulty, under the Allen theory, in including the entire 
40,000 dollars within A's gross estate. Furthermore, when A and 
B make reciprocal transfers in contemplation of A's death, thus 
creating a tenancy in common, the same result is reached, for 
the Allen "tax interest" theory will apply to any transfer to which 
A is a party. However, in the joint tenancy, as opposed to the 
tenancy by the entirety, it is possible for B to sever the tenancy 
unilaterally.92 Since section 2035 requires a transfer by the dece-
dent, this creates a major problem. For instance, B might convey 
his interest to X for 20,000 dollars in contemplation of A's death. 
Since A and X then hold as tenants in common, the tenancy is 
thereafter outside the reach of section 2040. Since there is no 
transfer by the decedent, the conveyance is outside section 2035's 
scope. The same result is reached when B transfers to a straw man 
88 Ibid. See also MOYNIHAN, op. cit. supra note 41, at 131. 
89 See 4 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 84, § 618, at 646. 
90 See Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Harris v. 
United States, 193 F. Supp. 736 (D. Neb. 1961); Estate of Don Murillo Brockway, 18 
T.C. 488 (1952), afj'd, 219 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1944). 
91 See Frank K. Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), rev'd, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); 
Nathalie Koussevitsky, 5 T.C. 650 (1945) (dictum). Cf. Estate of Thurston, 36 Cal. 2d 
207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950) (dictum). 
92 See Swenson &: Degnan, supra note 84, at 468. 
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who immediately conveys back to B, thus destroying the unity of 
time and creating a tenancy in common between A and B. 
This type of transaction illustrates that the Allen "tax inter-
est" theory is only a partial solution to the problem of providing 
section 2035 with maximum effectiveness in the section 2040 
context. Limiting section 2035 to any interest "of which decedent 
has at any time made a transfer" clearly does not cover the entire 
range of possibilities; the language of the provision is intrinsically 
defective. At the same time, it should be remembered that the 
"tax interest" theory has supplied an acceptable answer to almost 
all of the tenancy by the entirety situations, and to a substantial 
number of the joint tenancy situations. One might argue that 
the "tax interest" theory is unacceptable because it results in di-
vergent treatment of the two types of interests and is therefore 
a discriminatory concept. There are, however, at least two replies 
to this criticism. First, it must be apparent that the post-Sullivan 
view presented an evasion device to the taxpayer, and any im-
provement on this situation, albeit only partial, is good.93 Second, 
even under the Sullivan view, a correct analysis of the two tenan-
cies requires a divergent treatment. Sullivan laid down a rule 
as to a joint tenancy between H and W in a situation where it 
was quite apparent that W could alternatively have transferred 
her interest unilaterally and defeated section 2035. The tenancy 
by the entirety situation, however, is quite distinct at the local 
property law level, for W generally cannot convey without H 
joining in the transfer, and, therefore, in this situation there 
would be a conveyance by the decedent. Thus, the reasoning of 
Sullivan, when applied to a tenancy by the entirety, is at least 
questionable, even without considering the effect of Allen.94 
VI. THE TOTAL ANSWER: STATUTORY 'REVISION 
It must be obvious at this point that even the judicially de-
veloped "tax interest" theory has left a gap between sections 2035 
and 2040 which only a statutory revision can fill. One might 
suggest incorporating the standard "contemplation of death" pro-
vision into section 2040, much like Congress did in sections 2038 
and 2041. This would have the salutary attribute, at least, of 
03 For a criticism of the post-Sullivan view, see the materials cited in note 33 supra. 
04 See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 142 (1956). In terms of local property law, each tenant 
in a tenancy by the entirety owns the whole of the property. This is an offspring of the 
common-law fiction that H and W were one person. Thus, even under Sullivan, when 
H and W transfer a share to S, H is transferring a 100% interest. 
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stabilizing the often equivocal judicial treatment of the tax inter-
est and property law interest views. It would, in effect, be a 
codification of Allen. However, as was previously pointed out, 
such an amendment would supply only a partial answer, since 
transfers made other than by the decedent would remain beyond 
the reach of the statute. 
A complete solution might be effected by changing the lan-
guage of the "contemplation of death" provision, presently sec-
tion 2035, to read as follows: 
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property ... to the extent of any interest therein of which 
the decedent or his co-tenant, in a joint tenancy or a tenancy 
by the entirety, has at any time made a transfer ... by trust, 
or otherwise, in contemplation of the decedent's death." 
By adding this revised "contemplation of death" provision to sec-
tion 2040, the following results might be obtained. First, the gap 
left by Allen in situations where the decedent's co-tenant makes 
the transfer in contemplation of the decedent's death would be 
closed. Certainly this would implement the underlying purpose 
of the "contemplation of death" provision, which is "to reach 
substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to prevent the 
evasion of the estate tax."95 Second, it would accord equal treat-
ment to. both the joint tenancy and the tenancy by the entirety. 
One note of caution is necessary as to the scope of this proposed 
amendment. It would apply only to "contemplation of death" 
situations, i.e., testamentary type transfers. Even more impor-
tantly, it would have a significant impact only where one co-tenant 
has contributed a disproportionate amount of consideration for 
the tenancy and the other is acting unilaterally to reduce his co-
tenant's gross estate.96 In fact, a tenant who feels his co-tenant 
is near death stands to gain from the death because of the right 
of survivorship. Thus, the tenant in an arm's-length setting, with 
no financial inter~st in helping his co-tenant avoid estate tax, 
would in no way be affected by this amendment. As a practical 
matter, only testamentary transfers in family situations would be 
included within this suggested revised provision. 
Fredric L. Smith, S.Ed. 
95 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931). See Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 
15 (1931), where the Court stated: "Underlying the present statute is the policy of taxing 
such gifts equally with testamentary dispositions, for which they may be substituted, 
and the prevention of the evasion of estate taxes made before, but in contemplation of, 
death." Id. at 23. 
96 Cf. Philips v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1928). 
